Abstract. In this paper we study the interpretations of a weak arithmetic, like Buss' theory S 1 2 , in a given theory U . We call these interpretations the arithmetics of U . We develop the basics of the structure of the arithmetics of U . We study the provability logic(s) of U from the standpoint of the framework of the arithmetics of U . Finally, we provide a deeper study of the arithmetics of a finitely axiomatized sequential theory.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose and expose a particular way of viewing theories. We look at theories as a class of interpretations of a given weak arithmetical theory. Consider a theory U . We view the interpretations of the given weak arithmetical theory in U as 'occurrences' of that given theory in U . Thus, U appears as a class of copies of the given weak theory. If we consider a model M of U , the versions of the weak theory sitting inside U take the form of the set of internal models of the weak theory in M.
We will call an interpretation N of the given weak theory in U an arithmetic of U . The arithmetics of U have a natural ordering, the (definable) initial embedding ordering . We study basic facts concerning the arithmetics of U and the ordering in Section 3.
From the perspective of theories as containers of (possibly) lots of arithmetics, we study the provability logics of theories. We fully characterize the propositional modal principles for provability that hold in all arithmetics in any theory U . The only assumption being a constraint on the complexity of the set of axioms of U . The comparatively easy success of this characterization contrasts with the remaining great open questions of provability logic concerning the provability logics of theories like S 1 2 or I∆ 0 + Ω 1 . Section 4 briefly reviews some basic ideas concerning provability logic.
In Section 5, we study Solovay's Theorem in various settings. In Subsections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4, we present a proof of Solovay's Completeness Theorem for Löb's Logic via a wonderful version of the proof given by Dick de Jongh, Marc Jumelet and Franco Montagna. The main part of the proof is itself formulated in a richer modal logic which was formulated and studied by David Guaspari and Robert Solovay. The advantage of the de Jongh, Jumelet, Montagna proof is that it allows us to see clearly what arithmetical principles are involved in Solovay's proof. In Subection 5.5 we prove our characterization of the provability logic of all arithmetics of a given theory. In Subsection 5.6, we give a sufficient condition for when the provability logic of all theories is assumed at a single arithmetic N in U .
In Section 7, we provide an example of a theory U where the provability logic of U is not assumed at any arithmetic N in U .
In Section 6 we study the wondrous world of the arithmetics of a finitely axiomatized sequential theory U . In the sequential case we have many extra properties of our structure of arithmetics to work with. In this section we strengthen certain results due to Harvey Friedman and, indepently, to Jan Krajíček. We use the methods of Section 6 to construct the example of Section 7.
The reader interested in Provability Logic could very well choose to read Sections 2,3,4,5. The reader who is interested in the fine structure of the arithmetics of a theory could study Sections 2,3,6,(7). More details on the basics are provided in Appendix A.
About this Paper. The present paper is, in a sense, a remake of my paper [Vis91a] . It is the result of my reflection on what the earlier paper is saying.
We strengthen the results of that paper by presenting them in a better framework and we add new results relevant to the framework.
Prerequisites. We will presuppose some knowledge of weak arithmetics. See e.g. [Bus86] or [HP91, chapter V] . Some basic knowledge of provability logic will help to understand the paper. At present there are many expositions: [Smo85b] , [BS91] , [Boo93] , [Lin96] , [JdJ98] , [Šve00] , [AB04] . The most comprehensive source concerning the provability logic of weak theories is [Ver93] .
Basics
In this section we sketch the framework in which our discussion will take place. One problem of sections with basic notions and facts is that they are so long and so boring that the reader gets stuck in them and never arrives at the real stuff. So what I did is to make the present section rather sketchy. At the end of the paper, in Appendix A more details are provided. Regrettably, even without the details this section is rather long, so the reader is advised to go over it lightly and come back to it or Appendix A when needed.
2.1. Theories. Theories are, in this paper, one-sorted theories of first-order predicate logic, that have a finite signature and that are axiomatized by an axiom set that is represented by a ∆ b 1 -formula.
1
Remark 2.1. The demand for ∆ b 1 -axiomatization seems to be rather restrictive. However, it seems to me,that every real-life theory is given by an axiomatization that is p-time decidable.
Because in S 1 2 , we have the Σ b 1 -replacement axiom, we can relax our demand to the consideration of theories which are Σ b 1 -axiomatized. In this case, the witnesses of P U A would not be really a code of a proof but a somewhat modified object.
Note that, by a version of Craig's trick, every RE theory in extension can be given a ∆ b 1 -axiomatization. Of course, a weak theory will not be able to see that both axiomatizations prove the same theorems, so for the eyes of the weak theory the craigified theory will be a different theory. We need a theory like EA, aka I∆ 0 +exp, plus Σ 1 -replacement to make this construction work in a verifiable way.
The formula specifying the axiom set is part of the data for the theory. Thus, we treat theories intensionally and not as mere sets of theorems. We will explain why this is important for our purposes in Section 4.
We say that a theory is finitely axiomatized if its axiomatization has the form i<n x = A i .
2 Note that S 1 2 may prove that a theory has an axiom-set of, say, less than two axioms, without being able to prove the equivalence of the formula defining the axiom set with any formula of the prescribed form.
1 See [Bus86] or [HP91] for an explanation of the relevant formula classes. 2 The function · sends a syntactical object to its Gödel number. The function (·) sends a number to its numeral. We will employ efficient numerals that reflect binary notation.
We take identity to be a logical constant. Our official signatures are relational, however, via the term-unwinding algorithm, we can also accommodate signatures with functions.
Translations and Interpretations.
The notion of interpretation that we will employ in this paper will be m-dimensional interpretation without parameters. There are two extensions of this notion: we can consider piecewise interpretations and we can add parameters. We refrain from considering piecewise interpretations. We explain why in Subsection A.3 of Appendix A. We sketch a few basic ingredients of adding parameters in Subsection A.4 of Appendix A. We explain why, in the sequential case, addition of parameters makes no difference for the provability logic of all arithmetics of a given theory in Remark 3.9.
Consider two signatures Σ and Θ. An m-dimensional translation τ : Σ → Θ is a quadruple Σ, δ, F, Θ , where δ(v 0 , . . . , v m−1 ) is a Θ-formula and where for any nary predicate P of Σ, F(P ) is a formula A( v 0 , . . . , v n−1 ) in the language of signature Θ, where v i = v i0 , . . . , v i(m−1) . Both in the case of δ and A all free variables are among the variables shown. Moreover, if i = j or k = , then v ik is syntactically different from v j .
We demand that we have
Here is provability in predicate logic. This demand is inessential, but it is convenient to have.
We define B τ as follows:
• (P (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 )) τ := F(P )( x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ).
• (·) τ commutes with the propositional connectives.
•
We allow identity to be translated to a formula that is not identity. We can define the identity translation id Σ on Σ, the composition ρ • τ of translations τ and ρ, and the disjunctive translation τ A ρ, that is τ if A and ρ if ¬ A. We refer the reader to Appendix A for details.
A translation relates signatures; an interpretation relates theories. An interpretation K : U → V is a triple U, τ, V , where U and V are theories and τ : Σ U → Σ V . We demand: for all axioms A of U , we have V A τ .
In the context of the formalization of interpretability, we have to distinguish between axioms-interpretability, which is the notion we just introduced and theoremsinterpretability, where we demand that: for all theorems A of U , we have V A τ . In the real world these notions are equivalent, but we need a principle like Σ 1 -collection to prove that, so, for example Buss' theory S 1 2 does not 'know' this equivalence. See [Vis91b] for more information about this matter.
Here are some further definitions and conventions.
• Suppose K : U → V . We often write A K for A τ K , in the context of a theory W that extends V .
• We write U for the set of theorems of U . Suppose K : U → V . We write K := {A | V A K }. We note that U ⊆ K. If K = U , we will say that K is faithful.
• ID U : U → U is the interpretation U, id Σ U , U .
• Suppose K : W → U and U ⊆ V . We write K ↑ V for E U V • K.
• Suppose M : V → Z and U ⊆ V . We write U ↓ M for M • E U V .
. In an appropriate category K A M is a special case of a product.
The notation K : U → V is inspired by the idea of interpretations as arrows in a category. There is also an intuition of interpretability as a generalization of provability. The traditional notations and notions associated to this intuition are:
• K : V £ U stands for K : U → V .
• U ¡ V stands for ∃K K : U ¡ V . We say: U is interpretable in V .
• V £ U stands for ∃K K : V £ U . We say: V interprets U .
• U ¡ loc V means: all finitely axiomatized subtheories U 0 of U are interpretable in V . We say that U is locally interpretable in V .
• U ¡ mod V means that, for every M |= V , there is a translation τ such that τ (M) |= U . We say that U is model-interpretable in V .
2.3. i-morphisms. Consider an interpretation K : U → V . We can view this interpretation as a uniform way of constructing internal models τ K (M) of U from models M of V . This construction gives us the contravariant model functor as soon as we have defined an appropriate category of interpretations. Now consider two interpretations K, M : U → V . Between the inner models τ K (M) and τ M (M) we have the usual structural morphisms of models. We are interested in the case where these morphisms are V -definable and uniform over models. This idea leads to the notion of i-morphism. An i-morphism
is a V -formula and where in all models of V , F represents a morphism of models from
Two i-morphisms F, G : K → M are i-equal, when:
We will think about i-morphisms modulo i-equality without dividing this equivalence relation out.
In the obvious way, we can define the identity i-morphism Id K : K → K, composition of i-morphisms, i-isomorphisms, etc. All these operations preserve i-equality.
We easily see that i-isomorphisms really are isomorphisms in the category given by these operations.
We will say that two interpretations K, M are i-equivalent when there is an iisomorphism between them, i.e. they are i-isomorphic. The notion of i-equivalence is our intended notion of sameness of interpretations. We will, however, not divide out i-equivalence. This enables us to use the notation τ M meaningfully, to speak about the dimension of an interpretation, etc. Of course, we demand that operations on interpretations preserve i-equivalence. One may show that operations like identity, composition, (·) Thus, U and V are bi-interpretable if there are interpretations K :
We call the pair K, M a bi-interpretation between U and V . One can show that the components of a bi-interpretation are faithful interpretations. Many good properties of theories like finite axiomatizability, decidability, κ-categoricity are preserved by bi-interpretations.
2.4. Sequential Theories. The sequential theories form an important class of theories in this paper. A sequential theory provides an interpretation N of a weak number theory, say S 1 2 , and sequences of all objects of the domain of the theories with projections in N . We can use these sequences to develop partial satisfaction predicates. Using these we can prove restricted consistency statements of U in U . See Subsection 2.5 for more about this.
The notion of sequential theory has an very simple definition discovered by Pavel Pudlák. We first need the definition of a very weak set theory. The theory Adjunctive Set Theory or AS is a one-sorted theory with a binary relation ∈.
AS1 ∃x ∀y y ∈ x, AS2 ∀x, y ∃z ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u = y)).
We note that we do not demand extensionality. E.g., in AS we could have lots of 'empty sets'.
An interpretation is direct iff it is one-dimensional, unrelativised (i.e. it has the trivial domain) and identity preserving (i.e. it translates identity to identity).
A theory U is sequential iff it directly interprets AS. By a substantial bootstrap, we can define, in a sequential theory U , an interpretation N of a weak number theory, sequences of all objects, etc.
For details see, e.g., [Pud83] , [Pud85] , [MPS90] , [HP91] , [Vis09] and [Vis10] .
We can generalize the notion of sequentiality a bit to poly-sequentiality by replacing direct interpretation in the definition by its obvious generalization to the m-dimensional case. All results in this paper that we prove for sequential theories also hold for poly-sequential theories.
2.5. Complexity and Satisfaction. Restricted provability plays an important role in this paper. An n-proof is a proof from axioms with Gödel number smaller or equal than n only involving formulas of complexity smaller or equal than n. To work conveniently with this notion, a good complexity measure ρ is needed. This should satisfy three conditions. (i) Eliminating terms in favour of a relational formulation should raise the complexity only by a fixed standard number. (ii) Translation of a formula via the translation corresponding to an interpretation K should raise the complexity of the formula by a fixed standard number depending only on K. (iii) The tower of exponents involved in cut-elimination should be of height linear in the complexity of the formulas involved in the proof.
Such a good measure of complexity together with a verification of desideratum (iii) -a form of nesting degree of quantifier alternations-is supplied in the work of Philipp Gerhardy. See [Ger03] and [Ger05] . It is also provided by Samuel Buss in his preliminary draft [Bus11] . Buss also proves that (iii) is fulfilled. We give some details about these measures in Appendix A.
We will use proof U,n for the proof predicate where only U -axioms with Gödel numbers ≤ n are allowed and where the formulas occurring in the proof are in the complexity class Γ n of all formulas of complexity ≤ n. Similarly we use U n A, con n (U ), P U,m A, etc.
In sequential theories we can define partial satisfaction predicates for formulas with complexity below n, for any n. The presence of these predicates has as a consequence that for any sequential theory U and for any n, we can find an interpretation N of a weak arithmetic like Buss' S 1 2 in U such that U con N n (U ). See e.g. [Vis93] for more details.
The Arithmetics of a Theory
There are many heuristic ways to look at interpretations. For example, an interpretation is a uniform internal model construction. In the case of definitional extensions an interpretation is an enrichment of the interpreting or target theory. In this paper, we opt for a third heuristic: we view an interpretation as the interpreted theory in the context of the interpreting theory.
We will say that an interpretation N : S 1 2 → U is an arithmetic in U or an arithmetic of U . The theory S 1 2 is Buss' theory of p-time computability. See [Bus86] . We stipulate we work with a version of S 1 2 that is formulated in the language of arithmetic with (the relational versions of) 0, S, + and ×.
Remark 3.1. In our definition of arithmetic we are both rewarded and punished for having a strict typing regime om interpretations. The reward is that the target theory or interpreting theory or context is part of the data for an arithmetic. So we can speak about an arithmetic N without mentioning the context. The punishment is that, e.g., an interpretation K : EA → U is not an arithmetic. The associated arithmetic is S The main structure between arithmetics that we will consider is the initial embedding ordering . Consider two arithmetics N and N in U . An initial embedding F : N → N is an i-morphism satisfying the following additional property:
We write N N for: there is an initial embedding N, F, N of N in N . We note that is preserved by i-equivalence. I.o.w., i-equivalence is a congruence relation for the arithmetics of U with . So, i-equivalence is a subrelation of the induced equivalence relation of .
We call N a cut of N iff emb : N N , where emb is the identical embedding.
The most salient fact about is upwards preservation of Σ 1 -sentences and downward preservation of Π 1 -sentences. We formulate this as a theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose N and N are arithmetics in U and N N . Let S be any Σ 1 -statement and let P be any Π 1 statement. We have: U S N → S N and U P N → P N .
We leave the trivial proof to the reader. Arithmetics commute in all the right ways with bi-interpretations, as is shown in the next theorem. Proof. Let Ψ : N → N M be a mapping between the arithmetics of V and the arithmetics of U . It is easy to see that Ψ is the inverse of Φ, modulo i-equivalence. Clearly Φ and Ψ preserve , so it easily follows that Φ is an isomorphism w.r.t. .
Since the interpretations of an bi-interpretation are faithful, we find N = Φ(N ). P Arithmetics of a sequential theory can always be assumed to be one-dimensional, as is formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose U is sequential and N is an arithmetic in U . Then there is a 1-dimensional arithmetic M in U that is i-equivalent to N . We leave the trivial proof to the reader.
A fundamental fact about the arithmetics of a sequential theory follows by Pavel Pudlák's adaptation of Dedekind's proof of his Categoricity Theorem for second order arithmetic.
Theorem 3.5 (Púdlak). Consider a sequential theory U . Let N 0 and N 1 be arithmetics in U . Then, there is an arithmetic M in U such that M N 0 and M N 1 .
For a proof see e.g. [Pud85] .
In a sequential theory we have have a convenient reflection principle. We write Γ n for the class of all formulas of complexity ≤ n.
Theorem 3.6. Consider any sequential theory U and let N be an arithmetic in U . For any n, we can find an arithmetic M N such that, verifiably in S 1 2 , we have,
Sketch of the proof. The idea of the proof is that, in U , we can define a satisfaction predicate for Γ n , using the N -numbers, and prove Γ n -reflection by replacing induction over proof-length by the use of a definable cut M of N . For details see the proof of Fact 2.4.5(ii) of [Vis93] . In [Vis93] only verifiability of this fact in EA was claimed. However, the big disjunctions and conjunctions of exponential size used there are not needed, since for each proof p we only need the truth of the axioms occurring in p. So the disjunctions we really need are polynomial in p. The previous theorem shows that, for any n, we can 'improve' a given N to obtain n-reflection. In contrast, if U is finitely axiomatized, for any N , we can find an n such that, for any m ≥ n, we have anti-m-reflection, i.o.w., a version of Löb's theorem for N and m. We first need Lemma 4.1. of [Vis93] . For the convenience of the reader we reproduce it here.
Lemma 3.1. The following fact is verifiable in S We note that without the verifiability clause we could conclude A m B from A B. Since this step uses superexponentiation, it is not available in the context of S Proof. We can prove the lemma in two ways. itexp(x, |y|) exists. Here we define:
• itexp(x, z + 1) := 2 itexp(x,z) . itexp(kp, k |p|) exists, for standard k, k , we can apply cut-elimination to p inside S 1 2 . The second way is to note that, in S 1 2 + con m (A + ¬B)), we can build a Henkin interpretation H of A + ¬ B. It follows that con(S 1 2 + con m (A + ¬ B)) implies con(A + ¬ B). We find the desired result by contraposition. P Theorem 3.7. Suppose A is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory and that N is an arithmetic in A. We can find an n, such that m ≥ n, we have, for all
This theorem is a weaker version of Theorem 4.1 of [Vis93] . We sketch the proof since it is easier to read without the ballast of the stronger version of [Vis93] .
Proof. The proof is just the usual proof of Löb's Theorem with some checks that all the complexities are correct and one step involving Lemma 3.1 added. We choose:
Here sub is the formula defining the Gödel substitution function. It follows that n ≥ P . 4 We will use the following two properties of sat:
The two classical works on this subject are [Les78] and [PD82] .
Let J be an S 1 2 -cut such that S 1 2 x ∈ J → 2 2 x exists. We suppose Σ 1 -sentences are written in the form ∃x S 0 (x) where S 0 is ∆ 0 . (If not, we add an algorithm that rewrites the Σ 1 -sentence to this normal form.) We define:
• true(∃x S 0 (x)) := ∃x ∈ J sat(x, S 0 (v)),
We easily verify that TRUE has the desired property. P
Inspection of the proof of Theorem 3.8 shows that we can obtain reasonable commutation properties for TRUE in addition to mere Tarskian disquotation.
Remark 3.9. Suppose U is sequential. Let N be an arithmetic with parameters in U . In a model M of U we can view N as a definable class of internal models parametrized by models of U . Theorem 3.5 tells us how to construct an parameter-free arithmetic below two parameter-free arithmetics. With some care we can generalize the construction to produce one parameter-free arithmetic below N viewed as a class of internal models. For details on such a construction, see [Vis10] , the second proof of Theorem 5.2. As a result of this observation, the provability logic of all parameter-free arithmetics of U is the same as the provability logic of all arithmetics of U with parameters.
We end this section with a tentative discussion of what it means that has a minimal element. ii. U proves parameter-free Π 1 -induction for the N -numbers. In other words, we have
As a consequence, we have sentential Σ 1 -completeness in N .
iii. We have a Σ 1 -truth predicate TRUE satisfying Tarskian disquotation for Σ 1 -sentences on N .
Proof. We have (i) simply because if M N , then M N , and Σ 1 -sentences are upwards preserved. Ad (ii): As is easily seen parameter-free Π 1 -induction is equivalent to the parameterfree Σ 1 -minimum principle (over PA − ). 5 We prove the parameter-free Σ 1 -minimum principle for N . We reason in U . Suppose ∃x ∈ N S(x), where S is Σ 1 . Consider the virtual class X := {x ∈ N | ∀y < x ¬ S(x)}. Clearly 0 ∈ X. If X is not closed under successor, there is a z ∈ N such that z ∈ X and Sz ∈ X. By elementary reasoning we find that z is the minimal N -number such that Sz. If X is not closed under successor, we can shorten X to a cut J that satisfies S 1 2 . Thus J is an arithmetic below N . It follows that on J we have both ¬ ∃x Sx and ∃x Sx. A contradiction.
5 See [KPD88] and [CFL11] for details on IΠ The theory IΠ − 1 proves sentential Σ 1 -completeness since EA is conservative over IΠ − 1 w.r.t. Σ 2 -sentences as was proved in [KPD88] . Ad (iii): The existence of the desired truth-predicate is immediate from Theorem 3.8. P Theorem 3.11. Consider any sequential theory U . Suppose N is a -minimal arithmetic in U . It follows that:
ii. U is parameter-free essentially reflexive for N , i.e., for any n, and any sentence B ∈ Γ n , we have U P N U,n B → B. iii. U is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. (i) is immediate by Theorem 3.5. (ii) follows from Theorem 3.6 in combination with Theorem 3.10(i). Claim (iii) is immediate from (ii) in combination with Theorem 3.7. P Remark 3.12. Consider a sequential theory U and suppose that N is -minimal in U . It follows that the interpretability logic of U (for sentential substitutions), w.r.t. arithmetization in N , is ILM. See [BV05] for most ingredients of the proof.
Open Question 3.13. Suppose U is sequential and has a -minimal arithmetic N . Can we get a precise estimate what this implies? E.g., can one show that we do not get full induction for N ? Is any M N i-equivalent to N ? Such questions are both interesting in general and in the sequential case.
Introduction to Provability Logic
We start with the basics concerning Löb's Logic GL. We define the language L mod of propositional modal logic by:
The logic GL is axiomatized by the following axioms and rules.
GL1.
We have all substitution instances of propositional tautologies.
GL3. Pφ → PPφ.
GL5. If φ → ψ and φ, then ψ.
We have a completeness theorem for GL in finite, transitive, irreflexive Kripke models.
We define arithmetical interpretations of the modal language as follows. Let U be a theory and let N be an arithmetic in U . We define an N -translation σ as a mapping of the formulas of L mod to the sentences of the language of U , where σ commutes with the propositional connectives and where:
The variable 'a' will range over 0,1,. . . , ∞. We define:
• φ ∈ prl(N ) iff, for all N -translations σ, U σ(φ).
• φ ∈ prl all (U ) iff, for all arithmetics N in U , φ ∈ prl(N ).
• deg all (U ) := min({a | P a ⊥ ∈ prl all (U )}).
• In case U is an extension of S 1 2 in the language of arithmetic, we write
We have the following two major insights. Let exp be the axiom stating that exponentation is total.
Theorem 4.1. Consider any theory U . Let N be an arithmetic in U . We have:
I. prl(N ) extends GL (and is closed under the rules of GL).
In essence the proof of (I) is given in [Bus86] . Most of the ideas are also in [WP87] . Robert Solovay proved (II) for theories like PA which are reasonably strong and Σ 1 -sound. The extension to the case of Σ 1 -unsound theories extending PA was proved in [Vis81] . The fact that EA was needed on the designated interpretation of arithmetic slowly emerged. See [Ver93] . In Section 5 we give a sharper formulation of Theorem 4.1(II).
The gap between (I) and (II) provides the great open problem of provability logic. What happens in the gap? For an extensive discussion of this problem, see [BV06] .
Is the provability logic of an arithmetic a good property of arithmetics? It should at least be preserved under our chosen notion of sameness of arithmetics. We note that, if N is i-equivalent to N , then S 1 2 verifies this i-equivalence. It follows that:
Theorem 4.2. Consider any theory U and suppose that N and N are arithmetics in U and that N is i-equivalent to N . Then, for any N -translation σ and Ntranslation σ , we have: if σ(p) = σ (p) for all atoms p, then, for all φ, we have U σ(φ) ↔ σ (φ). It follows that prl(N ) = prl(N ) and deg(N ) = deg(N ). We have the same result on the weaker assumption that N N and N N .
So, in this sense, the provability logic of an arithmetic is a good property. On the other hand the provability logic of a theory-in-extension is dependent on the specification of the axiom set. The provability logic of a theory is intensional.
6
Example 4.3. Consider the theory U := PA + P PA P PA ⊥ with the obvious axiomatization. Clearly U P U P U ⊥. On the other hand, suppose U P U ⊥. Then,
So, PA + P PA P PA ⊥ P PA ¬ P PA P PA ⊥. And, hence, PA + P PA P PA ⊥ P PA ¬ P PA ⊥. By applying the formalized Second Incompleteness Theorem to the conclusion, we get: PA + P PA P PA ⊥ P PA ⊥. By Löb's Theorem, we obtain PA P PA ⊥. Quod non. So U P U ⊥. Now we modify the formula defining U , thus obtaining the theory U , by taking something to be an axiom if it is an axiom of U or it is of the form p = p, where p is a PA-proof of P PA ⊥. Clearly, U and U are extensionally equal.
Clearly PA + P PA P PA ⊥ P e U ⊥, and, hence,
We note that the arithmetics in our example are Σ 1 -unsound. It is unknown whether we can find two extensionally equal theories V and V and two arithmetics N := S 1 2 , τ, V and N := S 1 2 , τ, V such that N and, a fortiori, N are Σ 1 -sound that give rise to different provability logics. In case V exp N , where exp is the axiom stating that exponentiation is total, we will see that prl all (U ) = prl(N ) = GL = prl(N ) = prl all (V ). So any counterexamples for prl(N ) and prl(N ) should fail to prove the totality of exponentiation for N and any counterexamples for prl all (V ) and prl all (V ) should not contain any Σ 1 -sound arithmetic M that proves the principle exp M .
Because of intensionality, provability logics and degrees need not to be preserved by bi-interpretation. To get the appropriate notion of sameness that preserves provability logics and degrees we consider bi-interpretability for S 1 2 -verifiable interpretations.
We have chosen the formalized version of the theorems formulation of interpretability. This is convenient but not really necessary. As Emil Jeřábek pointed out to me Buss' witnessing theorem implies that S Proof. We first note that ( †) U proves, for some F that "F is an isomorphism between ID U and M • K". It follows that S 1 2 verifies the formalization of ( †). Similarly, for the isomorphism between ID V and K • M . Thus, we may conclude that ( †) S 1 2
Suppose σ is an N -translation. We prove by induction on φ, that, for al φ, we have
The only interesting case is when φ = Pψ. We have:
We note that step (3) uses ( †) and that step (4) uses the induction hypothesis.
Conversely, suppose φ is in prl(N ). Then, by Theorem 4.2, it follows that φ is in
By the above argument applied with V and U and K and M interchanged and with K • N in the role of N , we find:
Thus, if U and V are bi-interpretable via S 1 2 -verifiable interpretations, then the interpretations provide an isomorphism between their arithmetics that preserves and deg and prl.
Solovay's Theorem
In this section, we study the forms that Solovay's Theorem takes in various settings.
5.1. The Guaspari-Solovay System R − . In this subsection we give a careful analysis of the proof of Solovay's Theorem. We follow the modal presentation of the proof due Dick de Jongh, Marc Jumelet and Franco Montagna in their paper [dJJM91] .
We introduce the logic R − of Guaspari and Solovay and some subsystems of this logic. See [GS79] . The language of R − is given by:
The logic R − is axiomatized by the axioms and rules of GL (for the extended language) plus the following axioms.
We can split Axiom R − 4 into two parts that are jointly equivalent to R − 4:
We will consider two subsystems of R − to wit R − 0 and R − 1 . R − 0 is given by by the axioms and rules of GL (for the extended language) plus
5.2. Arithmetical Interpretations of R − . Consider any arithmetical theory U and any arithmetic N in U . We specify what it is to be an interpretation of the language of R − for U, N .
We remind the reader of the witness comparison notation. We define, for any C = ∃x C 0 (x) and D = ∃y D 0 (y):
We interpret the language of R − as follows. An N -translation σ sends the propositional variables to U -sentences, commutes with the propositional connectives and satisfies:
We assume that we are employing an ordinary single conclusion proof predicate. A modal formula φ is N -valid if for all N -translations σ, we have U σ(φ).
It is easily seen that the theory R − 0 is N -valid, for any N . The principles R − 4b, on the one hand, and R − 5 and R − 6, on the other, are not known to be N -valid. e.g.
The principle R − 4b is a modal articulation of a special case of the minimumprinciple. It tells us that if a certain sentence has a proof than it has a minimal proof. Since the proof-predicate is ∆ x ↓}. We define:
Since the proof of completeness for ∃Π b 1 -sentences only needs one exponent, we find
The two main theorems concerning provability logic of this paper, to wit Theorems 5.5 and 5.9, will employ T 1 2 to ensure the principle R − 4b. In contrast, we will not use B to obtain R − 5 & R − 6. This last theory is, in a sense, still too strong.
Clearly, CFL+Ω 1 extends B. The theories IΠ Our first aim is to embed a finite Kripke frame for ordinary modal logic in the logic R − extended with a finite set of constants and a finite set of axioms concerning these constants. Via the arithmetical validity of our modal theory this embedding subsequently induces an embedding in an arithmetic.
Let F be a finite, irreflexive, transitive Kripke frame on worlds {0, . . . , n − 1}. Our frame need not be rooted.
We write i j for: i and j are incomparable, i.e., i j and j i.
For i = 0, . . . , n − 1, we add constants i to the language of R − . Consider the following axioms.
The theory B as defined here seems to suffice. However, I am not sure that a definition using ∃ * Π b 1 -sentences is not more natural. 8 It takes a little argument to prove the equivalence of our formulation of CFL and the formulation in [CFL11] . For the definition it does not matter, modulo provable equivalence over T 1 2 , whether the Σ 1 sentences are written in the form ∃∆ 0 or ∃ * ∆ 0 . We may also consider sentences in ∃ * ∆ 0 and just relativize only the first of the block of existential quantifiers to J .
We add these axioms to R We adhere to the usual convention that the empty conjunction is and the empty disjunction is ⊥.
The N -interpretation of these principles is given as follows. By the Multiple Fixed Point Lemma we find sentences L i such that:
We will assume that, for i = j, we have L i = L j .
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We demand that σ( i ) := L N i . Thus we treat the i as constants.
10 For an abritrary arithmetic N this gives us the validity of R − 0,F .
Below we want to reason in an informal way in the theory R − (1),F . We want to reason as if we have predicate logic available, so that we can talk about statements like i j and so that we can quantify over the nodes of F . These problems can be solved as follows. A statement like i j in the context of R − (1),F . stands for when it is true and for ⊥ when it is false. Quantification over our finite domain is handled by translating it to iterated conjunctions and disjunctions.
We define:
Lemma 5.1 (R − 1,F ). Suppose i j, then ¬ (h i ∧ h j ). I.o.w., h i and h j , implies i j or j i.
Proof. Reason in R − 1,F . Suppose i j and h i and h j . Consider the i , such that i i, i j, and P¬ i . We note that there is such an i , to wit i, because i i, i j and P¬ i . The P¬ i are linearly ordered in the witness comparison ordering <. Suppose P¬ i is the <-smallest such element. Consider the j , such that j j, j i, and P¬ j . The node j is an example of such a j . The P¬ j are linearly ordered in the witness comparison ordering <. Suppose P¬ j is the ≤-smallest such element.
By the second conjunct of h i applied to j , we find P¬ i < P¬ j . By the second conjunct of h j applied to i , we find
9 I was aware of two essentially different constructions for the Multiple Fixed Point Lemma.
Vincent van Oostrom, after I asked him, provided a third construction. All three constructions automatically guarantee the desired property even in the presence of non-trivial automorphisms of the frame. One reason that this happens is that the choice of substitution-variables is explicitly arithmetically coded in the construction. 10 Note that the L i are not necessarily uniquely determined by the fixed point equations. Thus,
we are looking at some choice of the L i .
Proof. Reason in R − 1,F . In case i and j are incomparable, this is immediate by the previous lemma. Suppose, e.g., i ≺ j. Suppose i and j . From i , we have Q j , and, from j , we have P¬ j . A contradiction. P Proof.
There is one such j , to wit i. The P¬ j are linearly ordered by the witness comparison ordering <. Let j be the minimal such. It is easy to see that h j . By Lemma 5.4, we find a j j such that j . P
We define the theory R i<n (h i → Ph i ) Let K be any Kripke model on the frame F. We define an interpretation σ from L mod to the closed formulas of the language of R − F , by setting σ (p) := j p j , where σ commutes with the propositional connectives and P. We have:
Theorem 5.2. We have, for every formula φ of the modal language:
Proof. The proof is by induction on φ. The cases of the atoms and of the propositional connectives are trivial using Lemma 5.2 Suppose φ = Pψ.
Suppose i Pψ. We reason in R − 2,F . Suppose i . Then, h i and, hence Ph i . By Lemma 5.4, in combination with P¬ i , we find P j i j . So, by the induction hypothesis, we have Pσ (ψ).
Suppose i
Pψ. Then, for some j i, j ψ. We reason in R − 2,F . Suppose i . It follows that Q j . Ergo, by the induction hypothesis, Q¬ σ (ψ). Hence, ¬ Pσ (ψ). P Remark 5.3. The most naive attempt to avoid the use of h i → Ph i , is to replace P¬ i by P j i j (where we read Q as ¬ P¬) everywhere in the above definitions and arguments. This certainly will give us the "i Pψ"-part in the proof of Theorem 5.2 for free. It may amuse the reader to try this and to see where and why precisely it goes wrong. N . Suppose GL α φ. Let K be a finite counter Kripke model with frame F. We choose K in such a way that the set of worlds is {0, . . . , n − 1}, that the root is 0 and 0 φ. Note that the depth of the root must be k ≤ α. 1 -sentence. Let σ be the interpretation of the language of provability logic in the closed fragment of R − 2,F generated by p → i p i . We take the interpretation ν of the language of provability logic into the language of U to be τ •σ . Thus, ν is the N -interpretation generated by
Thus, since each j > 0 satisfies P k−1 ⊥, we find U P N,k−1 U ⊥, quod non. We may conclude that U ν(φ).
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of these considerations.
Theorem 5.4. Consider a theory U and an arithmetic N in U . We suppose that
5.5. All Arithmetics of a Theory. In this subsection, we apply the Solovay argument to all arithmetics of a theory U . We first show how we can improve our local arithmetic.
Consider any set of Σ 1 -sentences S with n elements. Let C S := S∈S (S → P S 1 2 S). Let J be an S 1 2 -cut such that S 1 2 ∀x ∈ J ∃y 2 2 x = y. We define: J 0 := ID,
The following argument is taken from [Vis91a] .
Lemma 5.6. We have: S Proof. Reason in S 1 2 . If we have C S , clearly J n = ID and we are done. Otherwise, for some S in S, we have S and ¬ P S 1 2 S. So, inside J, the sentence S will be false.
It follows that, inside J, the number of true S's from S is at least one less than inside ID. Now the game repeats itself inside J for J n−1 . Each time we have ¬ C S , we move inside J and loose at least one true S. If at some point, we have C S , we are done. Otherwise we end up with zero true S's and we have C S in J n . (Since n is standard the whole argument can be spelled out with big disjunctions, etc.) P We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5. Consider any theory U . We have prov all (U ) = GL + P deg(U ) ⊥.
We note that the result also is valid for the case that deg all (U ) = 0, i.e. when either U is inconsistent or S 1 2 is not interpretable in U .
Proof. Consider any theory U and suppose deg all (U ) = α. It is easily seen that
Suppose GL α φ. Then, there is a finite Kripke model K with nodes {0, . . . , n − 1} and with root 0, such that 0 φ and d(0) ≤ α. . In fact, we can shorten N 0 to a cut on which we have I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .) We note that deg(
We simultaneously construct a cut N in N 0 and the L i using the Gödel Fixed point Lemma. We find L i such that:
Here:
).
• H := {H 0 , . . . , H n−1 }.
We note that we have indeed a valid application of the Fixed Point Lemma since H occurs 'inside the box'.
We take N := N 1 • J H . We note that S 2 1
We now employ the interpretation ν of Subsection 5.4 using the L i constructed above. We find: U ν(φ). P 5.6. Theories with a Σ 1 -sound Arithmetic. In this subsection we provide a sufficient condition for a theory to contain an arithmetic N with prl(N ) = GL.
We will use the following facts.
Fact 5.6. Suppose N is an arithmetic in U . Then U £ (U + P N U ⊥).
This insight was first due Solomon Feferman in his classical paper [Fef60] . The simple proof below was discovered independently by Per Lindström (see [Fef97] ) and the author (see [Vis90] ).
Proof. Suppose N is an arithmetic in U . We have U + ¬P Proof. Suppose M : U £ V . We apply Fact 5.6 to the arithmetic M • N to find the desired result. P
We note that Facts 5.6 and 5.7 can be considered as nice and general formulations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Suppose that, for some arithmetic N in U , we would have U con N (U ). Since, by Fact 5.6, we have U £ (U + P N U ⊥), it follows that U is inconsistent.
Fact 5.8. Suppose U £ V and suppose that U contains a Σ 1 -sound arithmetic N , i.e., for all Σ 1 -sentences S, if U S N , then S is true. Then U £ faith V .
This fact is a direct consequence of Theorem B.4 of Appendix B. It was first proved in [Vis05] . The basic idea of the proof is due to Per Lindström.
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.9. Suppose U contains a Σ 1 -sound arithmetic N 0 . Then there is an N in U such that prl(N ) = GL.
Proof. Suppose that U contains a Σ 1 -sound arithmetic N 0 . We can find an interpretation of T 1 2 by shortening N 0 . By Fact 5.7, we find U £ (T 1 2 + P U ⊥). Let W be T 1 2 plus sentential Σ 1 -completeness for U . Since T 1 2 + P U ⊥ extends W we find: U £ W . By Fact 5.8, we can find an K such that K : U £ faith W . Finally, let N := S 1 2 ↓ K. Since W is a true theory, N is a Σ 0 1 -sound arithmetic in U . Hence deg(N ) = ∞. By Theorem 5.4 we find that prl(N ) = GL. P
Deep Arithmetics
In this section we study the fine structure of the arithmetics of a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. Finitely axiomatized sequential theories have many surprising properties. The present section builds on and extends a line earlier work, to wit: [Smo85a] , [Pud85] , [Kra87] , [Vis93] and [Vis05] .
We have the following definition. Suppose A is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. (We confuse these theories with their single axiom.) Let N be an arithmetic in A.
• N is Σ 1 -veracious in A iff
Thus, we see that Σ 1 -veracity is the S 1 2 -verifiable Σ 1 -conservativity of N over E S 1 2 (S 1 2 +con ρ(A) (A)) .
• N is strong in A iff A con N ρ(A) (A).
• N is deep in A iff N is both Σ 1 -veracious and strong in A.
Σ 1 -veracity is connected to Σ 1 -soundness: this is elucidated by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that A is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory and N is Σ 1 -veracious in A. Then,
Here true is a Σ 1 truth predicate.
Proof. By [WP87] , the theory EA, aka I∆ 0 + exp, proves uniform Π 2 -reflection for cutfree-provability in S 1 2 . Hence, I∆ 0 + supexp proves uniform Π 2 -reflection for ordinary provability in S 1 2 . Our theorem is immediate from this. P
In the definition of Σ 1 -veracious theory we may replace ρ(A) by any m ≥ ρ(A), in the light of the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. Let A be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. Suppose that m ≥ ρ(A). We have:
Proof. The right-to-left direction of our theorem is trivial.
To go from m-provability to ρ(A)-provability we need to eliminate standard (prooftheoretical) cuts. So we only need a multi-exponential transformation. 11 Thus, there is an S . Thus, we may conclude
If an arithmetic is deep, we can strengthen the implication in Σ 1 -veracity to a bi-implication.
Theorem 6.3. Let A be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. Suppose N is a deep arithmetic in A. We have:
We leave the simple proof to the reader.
11 We use the work of [Ger03] , [Ger05] and [Bus11] here. See Subsection A.5 of Appendix A.
Theorem 6.4. Let A be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. Each of the following classes is, S 1 2 -verifiably downwards closed under : the Σ 1 -veracious theories, the strong theories and the deep theories.
Iterated inconsistencies take a simple form for Σ 1 -veracious arithmetics, as will be proved in the next theorem.
Theorem 6.5. Suppose A is sequential and N is a Σ 1 -veracious arithmetic in A. We have:
Proof. We prove then left-to-right direction by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial.
Suppose we have ( † n ). We prove ( † n+1 ). We have in S 1 2 ,
Here step (8) uses the induction hypothesis.
The right-to-left direction is proved by a trivial induction. P Corollary 6.6. Suppose A is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory and N is a Σ 1 -veracious arithmetic in A. We have:
In the next theorem, we establish the existence of lots of deep arithmetics in a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. The proof of the theorem employs a form of the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington fixed point. See [Vis05] for a discussion of this fixed point. Proof. Let A be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory and let N 0 be an arithmetic in A.
Let true be a Σ 1 -truth predicate. For the construction of such a truth predicate, see [HP91, Chapter V(5)]. The two classical works on this subject are [Les78] and [PD82] . We will use the following two properties of true: for S in Σ 1 ,
x exists. Then, we have
We remind the reader of the witness comparison ordering. We define, for any C = ∃x C 0 (x) and D = ∃y D 0 (y):
By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find R such that, for a suitably chosen m:
We note that the complexity ρ(R) of R is not dependent on S and m, since numerals do not change the complexity of a formula even if the numeral is given a relational representation. Moreover, for any B and K, ρ(B K ) is linear in ρ(B). Hence, we may choose m so large that max(ρ(A), ρ(R N0 )) ≤ m.
We choose N 1 to be an initial segment of N 0 such that:
N1 , i.o.w., A proves that, in N 1 , if true(S) is witnessed, then true(S) has a minimal witness.
We can always find such an N 1 since (i) we have a truth predicate for formulas of complexity ≤ m and since (ii) we can interpret I∆ 0 + Ω 1 in S We note that N 1 is strong, and that, hence, N is strong. We show that N is Σ 1 -veracious.
We reason, for the rest of the proof, in S 1 2 . Consider any Σ 1 -sentence S. Suppose P A S N . It follows, by (T2) that P A (true(S)) N1 . Ergo, by (U2),
By Lemma 3.1, we may conclude ( †) P S 1 2 P A,m R N0 .
We can find an S 1 2 -cut J , on which we have T 1 2 , so that if something is A-provable with a proof in J , then there is a minimal proof. We can arrange that J is so small that S 1 2 x ∈ J → 2 2 x exists. We find from ( †):
We may conclude:
Since we have Σ 1 -completeness in the presence of double exponentiation, it follows that:
Hence, P S 1 2 (S ∨ P A,m ⊥), or, in a different formulation:
By Theorem 6.2, we may conclude that P S 1 2 (con ρ(A) (A) → S).
We have proved that, for every finitely axiomatized sequential theory A, and, for every arithmetic N 0 in A, there is a deep arithmetic N in A with N N 0 . To see that this argument is verifiable in S 1 2 , we have to see that the construction of N from N 0 is feasible. We note that m in our argument remains standard even if S is non-standard. As a consequence e.g., δ N = φ(δ N0 , Z N0 , S N0 , . . .), where φ is a fixed standard context. Thus N will be p-time in N 0 . P Discussion 6.8. Clearly, the Second Incompleteness Theorem implies that adding con(U ) to a consistent theory U that contains an arithmetic, gives us a stronger theory, a theory that is, so to say, one gödel stronger. However, it is clear that we have to ask: to what arithmetic in U are we adding the consistency statement?
Consider GB and let neumann be the interpretation of S 1 2 in the finite von Neumann ordinals. Clearly, PA con(GB) → con(GB + con neumann (GB)).
In fact, by the Second Incompleteness Theorem, GB cannot prove this statement w.r.t. the neuman-interpretation. However, for a Σ 1 -veracious arithmetic N in GB, we have:
Thus, in which theories the relative consistency of a theory plus its consistency statement w.r.t. that theory can be verified is dependent on the chosen arithmetic. Adding con N (GB) adds less strength to GB than adding con neumann (GB) does.
So the gödel is not such a good unit when we define it as how much stronger a theory becomes when we add its consistency statement. My proposal would be to take as the theory that is one gödel stronger: S 1 2 + con(U ). Note that the strength of S 1 2 + con(U ) still depends on the chosen axiomatization of U . In the case of a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and a Σ 1 -veracious arithmetic N in A, we have:
. So, by the measure of S 1 2 -verifiable relative consistency, adding the consistency statement for a Σ 1 -veracious arithmetic in A, is adding one gödel. Note that there are no arithmetics in, say, PA with the same property.
The next theorem shows that under a verifiability condition, Theorem 6.7 can be strengthened to theories that are mutually interpretable with a finitely axiomatized sequential theory.
Theorem 6.9. Suppose A is a consistent finitely axiomatized sequential theory and U is any theory. Suppose K : A £ U and M : U £ A. Then, there is an arithmetic N in U , such that:
Here £ thm stands for theorems-interpretability, where we demand that the interpreting theory proves the translations of the theorems of the interpreted theory. In the context of arithmetics without Σ 1 -collection this notion is not provably equivalent to the usual notion of axioms-interpretability.
Proof. Suppose K : A £ U and M : U £ A. We find P S 1 2 (M : U £ A). Consider any arithmetic N 0 in A. We note that N 1 := N 0 M K is also an arithmetic in A.
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Let N 2 be an arithmetic in A such that N 2 N 0 and N 2 N 1 . We may assume that in N 2 we have I∆ 0 + Ω 1 , or a sufficiently large, finitely axiomatized part of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 .
Let k be the complexity of (true(x)) N0 , where true is the Σ 1 -truth predicate. By Theorem 3.7, we can choose m so large that, S 1 2 -verifiably,
Let N 4 be a cut of N 3 such that
Finally, we take N := N 4 M . So N is an arithmetic in U .
By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we find R such that:
We reason in S 1 2 . We have, for all Σ 1 -sentences S,
Suppose K : A £ thm U . We also have: M : U £ A. Consider any S and suppose P U S N . It follows that P A S N4M K . By the previous result, we may conclude P A R N0M K , i.e., P A R N1 . From this, we have:
So, by Equation 10, we have: P A R N0 . It follows that P S 1 2 P A,m R N0 . We now may repeat the reasoning of the proof of Theorem 6.7. So we get
And we are done. P
An Example
In this section, we provide an example of a sequential theory W , such that the degrees of the arithmetics in W are finite and cofinal in ω. So, for every n there is an arithmetic in W with degree k ≥ n, but there is no arithmetic in W with degree ∞.
We start with a consistent finitely axiomatized sequential theory A. Pick any arithmetic N in A. Let Σ be the signature of A and let Θ be the signature of arithmetic.
Let τ : Θ → Σ be a translation. We define
Here we assume that the axioms of identity are an explicit part of the axiomatization of S 1 2 . It is easily seen that τ is an arithmetic in A. We assign to any translation τ : Θ → Σ a Gödel number gn(τ ). We define:
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We note that there is a p-time algorithm to decide whether a sentence is of the form (P
W , the interpretations K and τ K ↑ W coincide, hence, by an easy induction,
We show that, for any n, the theory W contains an arithmetic with degree ≥ n. Consider any number n.
Let N be a strong arithmetic in A that has an initial embedding in all arithmetics
We note that N • is an arithmetic in A. We want to show that W P N•↑W,n W ⊥. This will be a direct consequence of the following claim.
Claim: We have, S 1 2
We first show how our desired result follows from the claim. Suppose W P N•↑W,n W ⊥. Since, S 1 2 is a true theory, the claim gives us, by applying reflection a number of times, P A ⊥. Quod non. Note that this argument can be formalized in I∆ 0 +supexp.
Proof of the claim: By our conventions, we may write P N•↑W,n W ⊥ as P N•,n W ⊥. We will apply this convention to increase readability. We prove by induction that, for each j ≤ n,
13 In stead of (2
τ , we could also have used 2 e τ ,gn(τ )+1 A ⊥, but it seems to me that the argument is a bit shorter under the present choice. 14 Alternatively, we could have constructed W using a version of Craig's trick, taking as axioms
For the case j = 0, we have to prove: S 1 2
Consider any W -proof p of ⊥. If p only employs the axiom A, we are done. Suppose p employs at least one axiom of the form (P
be the set of such axioms employed in p. By our assumption X is not empty.
We construct an arithmetic M in A, such that M τ , for all τ ∈ X. Suppose τ 0 ∈ X. For each τ we construct an initial embedding F τ of an initial segment J τ of τ 0 in τ . This construction is uniform in τ and |F τ | is linear in |τ |. We take M to be the intersection of the J τ .
The definition of M involves e.g. a conjunction δ M (x) :↔ τ ∈X J τ (x). Why is this conjunction not too big? Under reasonable assumptions, we have:
Moreover, |J τ | of is linear in |gn(τ )| and, hence, linear in |p|. Moreover the size of X is < |p|. Hence |M | is bounded by L(|p|) × |p|, where L is a standard linear term. So M is below a · (ω 1 (p)) b , for some standard a and b.
Clearly, each axiom in X is implied by P M A ⊥. So, we have P A+2 M A ⊥ ⊥, and, hence P A ⊥, by the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
An alternative way, to prove this, is to adapt the proof of the second incompleteness theorem as follows. We still reason inside S 1 2 . By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we construct G such that:
Note that the big disjunction exists inside S 1 2 , since the set X is derived from p. We have:
Step (22), uses the fact that we have ∃Σ b 1 -completeness for every τ . From our assumption on X, it clearly follows that P A+ V τ ∈X 2 e τ A ⊥ ⊥. Hence, we find P A τ ∈X con e τ (A), and, so, by (24), P A τ ∈X G e τ . We may conclude P A ⊥.
The nice feature of this second argument is that it does not use sequentiality.
We stop reasoning in S 1 2 . We now prove ($ j+1 ), for j + 1 ≤ n, where use the induction hypothesis ($ j ).
We reason again in S 1 2 .
Suppose P W P N•,j+1 W ⊥. Our induction hypothesis, $ j , gives us:
Let p be a proof witnessing P W (P
2 P A ⊥) e τ occurs as an axiom in p. We clearly have:
Let X 0 be the set of elements τ of X with gn(τ ) ≤ j, and let X 1 be the set of elements of X with gn(τ ) > j. Since j + 1 ≤ n, we find that N τ , for any τ with gn(τ ) ≤ j. It follows that, inside
Reasoning as in the case j = 0, we can find an arithmetic M in A, such that M τ , for all τ ∈ X 1 . Moreover, we can choose M in such a way that it is deep.
We have to move in a careful way, at this point, to compensate for our lack of induction. Clearly, we can find a standard cut J, such that:
If follows that for p-time computable f with standard code:
We note that, we can find a p-time computable g with standard code such that:
Using Equations (27) and (28), we can transform the proof p of Equation (25), to a proof s witnessing the following provability:
Hence, using B for B ∧ PB:
Since M is deep, we find:
Hence,
Since N • is deep, we get:
It follows that:
By the Second Incompleteness Theorem, we have:
Ergo:
So, by Löb's Theorem,
This is what we wanted to prove. P We end this section by providing a bit of information on the relationship between A and W . By Theorem 6.9, it follows that W is not interpretable in A. On the other hand, it turns out that W is model-interpretable in A. Consider any model M of A. In case for all arithmetics N in M we have P N A ⊥, we find that M |= W . So we can take the identity translation to provide an inner model of M . Suppose, for some N , we have M |= con N (A). We note that the proof of ($ 0 ) works for an arbitrary arithmetic. So we have M |= con N (W ). We use the Henkin interpretation to provide an inner model of W .
There are several important operations on translations.
• id Σ is the identity translation. We take δ idΣ (v) := v = v and F(P ) := P ( v).
• We can compose translations. Suppose τ : Σ → Θ and ν : Θ → Λ. Then ν • τ or τ ν is a translation from Σ to Λ. We define:
• Let τ, ν : Σ → Θ and let A be a sentence of signature Θ. We define the disjunctive translation σ := τ A ν : Σ → Θ as follows. We take m σ := max(m τ , m ν ). We write v n, for the restriction of v to the first n variables, where n ≤ length( v).
Note that in the definition of τ A ν we used a padding mechanism. In case e.g. m τ < m ν , the variables v mτ , . . . , v mν −1 are used 'vacuously' when we have A.
If we had piecewise interpretations, where domains are built up from pieces with possibly different dimensions, we could avoid padding by building the domain of disjoint pieces with different dimensions.
A translation relates signatures; an interpretation relates theories. An interpretation K : U → V is a triple U, τ, V , where U and V are theories and τ : Σ U → Σ V .
We demand: for all axioms A of U , we have V A τ .
Remark A.1. The design choice to make interpretations a transition between theories has many advantages. It allows us to build various categories of theories and interpretations; it allows us to have a decent model-functor on categories of theories and interpretations; in various arguments, it reminds us where we are, etc. However, in some cases, the typing regime is somewhat stifling. E.g., if you have an interpretation K : U → V and an extension W of V , then is would seem that K is also an interpretation of U in W . The typing regime forces us to say that it is a lifting K ↑ W : U → W , that is the interpretation based on τ K , etc. In this paper we will remain faithful to the typing regime, but we will alleviate it a bit by the convention below.
Here are some further definitions.
A.2. i-morphisms. Consider an interpretation K : U → V . We can view this interpretation as a uniform way of constructing internal models τ K (M) of U from models M of V . This construction gives us the contravariant model functor as soon as we have defined an appropriate category of interpretations. Now consider two interpretations K, M : U → V . Between the inner models τ K (M) and τ M (M) we have the usual structural morphisms of models. We are interested in the case where these morphisms are V -definable and uniform over models. This idea leads to the following definition. An i-morphism
is a V -formula and where u has length m K and v has length m M . We demand: (F ( u, v) ↔ G( u, v) ).
In the obvious way, we can define the identity i-morphism Id K : K → K, composition of i-morphisms, i-isomorphisms, etc. One can show that these operations preserve i-equality. Moreover, i-isomorphisms really are isomorphisms in the categories given by these operations.
We will say that two interpretations K, M are i-equivalent when there is an iisomorphism between them, i.e. they are i-isomorphic.
We will not divide out i-equivalence of interpretations. This enables us to use the notation τ M meaningfully, to speak about the dimension of an interpretation, etc. However, we demand that operations on interpretations preserve i-equivalence. It is easy to see that e.g. the operation K, M → K A M preserves i-equivalence. Moreover, if K and M are i-equivalent, then K = M .
One can show, by a simple compactness argument, that K and M are i-isomorphic iff, for every M |= V , there is an F such that F M represents an isomorphism between τ K (M) and τ M (M).
The category INT 1 is the category of theories (as objects) and interpretations modulo i-equivalence (as arrows). One may show that we have indeed defined a category. The relation of i-equivalence is preserved by composition, etcetera. Two theories U and V are bi-interpretable if they are isomorphic in INT 1 . Wilfrid Hodges calls this notion: homotopy. See [Hod93] , p222.
Thus, U and V are bi-interpretable if there are interpretations K : U → V and M : V → U , so that M • K is i-isomorphic to ID U and K • M is i-isomorphic to ID V . We call the pair K, M a bi-interpretation between U and V . One can show that the components of a bi-interpretation are faithful interpretations. Many good properties of theories like finite axiomatizability, decidability, κ-categoricity are preserved by bi-interpretations.
A.3. Piecewise Interpretations. There is a notion of piecewise interpretability where we allow the domain of the interpretation to be built up from finitely many pieces with possibly different dimensions. An example of this is the construction where we add points at infinity to a points-only version of plane geometry. We could have a piece with the original points and strict identity and a piece with pairs of distinct points with the following equivalence relation (x, y) is equivalent to (u, v) is there is no point w that is both collinear with x and y and with u and v. Of course, we can replace this interpretation by a one-piece interpretation that is isomorphic (in an appropriate sense) to it in various obvious ways. E.g. a pair (x, y) could represent a point at infinity if x = y and the point x if x = y.
One can show that, if we have V ∃x, y x = y, then any piecewise interpretation is isomorphic (in an appropriate sense) to an interpretation without pieces (but in general with higher dimension). It follows that a theory piecewise interprets a weak arithmetic if and only if it interprets this arithmetic non-piecewise via an interpretation that is in a relevant sense i-equivalent to the original one.
A.4. Parameters. In general interpretations are allowed to have parameters. We will briefly sketch how to add parameters to our framework. We first define a translation with parameters. The parameters of the translation are given by a fixed sequence of variables w that we keep apart from all other variables. A translation is defined as before, but for the fact that now the variables w are allowed to occur in the domain and in the translations of the predicate symbols in addition to the variables that correspond to the argument places. Officially, we represent a translation τ w with parameters w as a quintuple Σ, δ, w, F, Θ . The parameter sequence may be empty: in this case our interpretation is parameter-free.
An interpretation with parameters K : U → V is a quadruple U, α, E, τ w , V , where τ w : Σ U → Σ V is a translation and α is a V -formula containing at most w free. The formula α represents the parameter domain. E.g., if we interpret the Hyperbolic Plain in the Euclidean Plain via the Poincaré interpretation, we need two distinct points to define a circular disk. These points are parameters of the construction, the parameter domain is α(w 0 , w 1 ) = (w 0 = w 1 ). (For this specific example, we can also find a parameter-free interpretation.) The formula E represents an equivalence relation on the parameter domain. In practice this is always pointwise identity for parameter sequences, but for reasons of theory one must admit other equivalence relations too. We demand:
• V ∃ w α( w);
• V proves that E represents an equivalence relation on the sequences forming the parameter domain;
• E( w, z) → ∀ x 0 , . . . , x n−1 (P τ, w ( x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) ↔ P τ, z ( x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ));
• for all U -axioms A, V ∀ w (α( w) → A τ, w ).
We can lift the various operations in the obvious way. Note that the parameter domain of N := M • K and the corresponding equivalence relation should be:
, where G( u, w) and F ( u, w, x, y) are V -formulas. 16 We write F u; w ( x, y) for F . We demand that:
• V proves that G is a surjective relation between α K /E K and α M /E M ;
17
16 In G and F we could allow extra parameters, z, the eigenparameters of G and F . We will refrain from doing that here to unburden the presentation a bit. 17 It seems a more logical choice to demand that G represents a function from α K /E K to α M /E M . There are also sound theoretical reasons for that choice. However, the definition of
• V proves that if E K ( u 0 , u 1 ) and E M ( w 0 , w 1 ), then F u0, w0 is the same function is F u1, w1 .
Finally, we say that two i-maps φ 0 and φ 1 are i-equal if V proves that G φ0 and G φ1 and F φ0 and F φ1 are the same.
The definitions of the identity i-morphism and of composition of i-morphisms are as is to be expected. We can compute what an i-isomorphism is: G is, V -verifiably, a bijection between α K /E K and α M /E M , and V proves that, if G( u, w), then F u; w is a bijection between δ K /= K and δ M /= M .
A.5. Complexity Measures. Restricted provability plays an important role in this paper. An n-proof is a proof from axioms with Gödel number smaller or equal than n only involving formulas of complexity smaller or equal than n. To work conveniently with this notion, a good complexity measure is needed. This should satisfy three conditions. (i) Eliminating terms in favour of a relational formulation should raise the complexity only by a fixed standard number.
(ii) Translation of a formula via the translation corresponding to an interpretation K should raise the complexity of the formula by a fixed standard number depending only on K. (iii) The tower of exponents involved in cut-elimination should be of height linear in the complexity of the formulas involved in the proof.
Such a good measure of complexity together with a verification of desideratum (iii) -a form of nesting degree of quantifier alternations-is supplied in the work of Philipp Gerhardy. See [Ger03] and [Ger05] . It is also provided by Samuel Buss in his preliminary draft [Bus11] . Buss also proves that (iii) is fulfilled.
Gerhardy's measure corresponds to the following formula classes:
• AT is the class of atomic formulas.
• N −1 = Σ −1 = Π −1 := ∅.
• N n ::
• Σ n ::= AT | ¬Π n | (N n−1 ∧ N n−1 ) | (Σ n ∨ Σ n ) | (Π n → Σ n ) | ∀ Π n−1 | ∃ Σ n .
• Π n ::= AT | ¬Σ n | (Π n ∧ Π n ) | (N n−1 ∨ N n−1 ) | (N n−1 → N n−1 ) | ∀ Π n | ∃ Σ n−1 .
We may define ρ(A) as the minimal n such that A is in N n .
18
Samuel Buss gives the following formula classes.
• Σ * 0 = Π * 0 = the class of quantifier-free formulas.
• Σ * n ::= Σ *
• Π * n ::= Σ * n−1 | Π *
initial embedding that we need in Section 3 does not work under this second choice. So for the purposes of at least this paper we seem to need the definition given in the main text.
18 Vincent van Oostrom gave a variant of this formulation of Gerhardy's measure in conversation.
We may define ρ(A) as the smallest n such that A is in Σ * n . This is the same measure, as was employed in [Vis93] . For our purposes it does not matter whether we use Gerhardy's of Buss' definition.
Appendix B. On Faithful Interpretability
We assume that the formalization of syntax is standard, so that the code of a subformula C of B is smaller than the code of B, etc. We also assume that the proof-predicate is standard, so that every proof p has a single conclusion C with C < p, etc.
Theorem B.1. Consider a theory T and suppose that N is an arithmetic in T . Let Γ be any T -definable class of T -sentences for which T contains a definable truth predicate, say TRUE for sentences coded in N . We only need that TRUE satisfies Tarski's convention. We assume that the set of codes of elements of Γ has a fixed binumeration in T (which, par abus de langage, we call also Γ). So we assume: if A ∈ Γ, then T A ∈ Γ and, if A ∈ Γ, then T A ∈ Γ. Then, there is a unary predicate A(x), such that:
ii. T (A(x) ∧ x = N y) → A(y).
iii. T (A(x) ∧ A(y)) → x = N y.
iv. For any n, T + A(n) is Γ-conservative over T .
Here n is the N -numeral of n.
Proof. We define, for p ∈ N and B an N -code of a formula with at most one designated variable v 0 free:
• (p, x, B) :↔ p, x ∈ N ∧ ∃C ∈ Γ ( proof N T (p, B(x) → C) ∧ ¬ TRUE(C) ). Here B(x) in the context of proof means the code of the result of substituting the numeral of x for v 0 in B. We find, using the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, a formula A with the following property.
T A(x) ↔ ∃p ( (p, x, A) ∧ ∀q < N p ∀y ∈ N ¬ (q, y, A)).
Clearly, we have (i) and (ii). We prove the uniqueness clause (iii).
Reason in T . Suppose that x = N y and A(x) and A(y). Let p be a witness for A(x) and let q be a witness of A(y). By our assumption about the proof predicate, it find that p = N q, and, hence, p < N q or q < N p. By the specification of A, this is impossible.
We move to the metatheory again. We prove (iv). We write r : T E for: r is (a code of) a T -proof of E.
We assume, to get a contradiction, that, for some n, A(n) is not Γ-conservative over T . Let p be the smallest proof such that, for some n and some C ∈ Γ, we have p : T A(n) → C and T C. It follows that, for all q < p, and all m and all D ∈ Γ, if q : T A(m) → D, then T D. It follows that: T ∀q < N p ∀y ∈ N ¬ (q, y, A).
We also find: T ¬ C → (p, n, A). Ergo T + ¬C A(n). In other words, we have both T + A(n) C and T + ¬ A(n) C. Ergo T C. A contradiction. P By the specification of the above formula A it functions as a closed partial Nnumerical term in T . For this reason we will write τ N x for A(x).
Theorem B.2. Let T be a theory and suppose that N is an arithmetic in T . Let Σ be a finite signature for predicate logic. We call predicate logic of signature Σ: FOL Σ . Let α(x) be a formula in the language of T such that T proves that all elements of {x | α(x)} are N -codes of Σ-sentences. We write P α for provability from the sentences coded by the elements of {x | α(x)}. We write con(α) for ¬ P α ⊥.
There is an interpretation H : (T + con(α)) £ FOL Σ such that, for any Σ-sentence A, we have T + con(α) + P α A A H . We say that H is a Henkin interpretation of α.
Proof. We can see this by inspection of the usual proof of the Interpretation Existence Lemma. The basic idea is that we formalize the Henkin construction, employing definable cuts whenever we would have used induction in PA. See e.g. [Vis91b] or [Vis92] . P
We proceed with our upperbound result. Proof. Consider T +A. We first show that we may assume without loss of generality that we have a Σ 1 -truth predicate for N .
By Theorem 3.8, we may shorten N to a T + A-definable cut N such that T + A contains a truth predicate, say TRUE, for the Σ 1 -sentences of N , i.e., for every S in Σ 1 , U S N ↔ TRUE(S), where S inside the truth predicate is coded in N .
Note that: T + A P N U B ⇒ T + A P N U B. It follows that it is sufficient to prove our theorem for N .
Thus, we may assume that T contains a truth predicate, say TRUE, for the Σ 1 -sentences of N .
Let τ be the partial closed term promised by Theorem B.1 for N and Σ 1 . We fix some standard enumeration C x of the U -sentences in such a way that T verifies its elementary properties w.r.t. N . We specify M by cases. In case we have ¬A, we take M equal to K. Suppose we have A. We may now work in T + A. Let U * := U + {C x | τ N x}. Note that (i) U * is not ∆ b 1 -axiomatized, and that (ii) in talking about U * we are really talking about the formula defining the axiom set and that (iii) the definition of U * only makes sense in the presence of A. In case incon N (U * ), 19 we take M again equal to K. If con(U * ), we take M equal to the 19 In writing (in)con N (U * )', we intend no relativization of the formula defining the axiom set, only of the proofs.
Henkin-interpretation H of U * . In other words, we take
Clearly, M : T £ U . Suppose T B M . Let ¬ B = C n . We have:
T + A + τ N n "(U + ¬B) = U * ".
Here "=" stands for extensional identity. Hence,
Thus, T + A (τ N n) → P N U B. By the Σ 1 -conservativity of τ N n, we find T + A P N U B.
P From Theorem B.3 we can derive basic result about interpretability. We say that a theory U is trustworthy if, whenever U £ V , then U £ faith V .
Theorem B.4. The following are equivalent.
i. U is trustworthy.
ii. U faithfully interprets predicate logic with a binary predicate R.
iii. For some A, U + A contains a Σ 1 -sound arithmetic N .
Proof. Trivially (ii) follows from (i).
Suppose (ii). Let B be the single axiom of adjunctive set theory AS. In AS we can provide a Σ 1 -sound interpretation M of S 1 2 . Suppose K is the promised faithful interpretations of predicate logic with a binary relation symbol R in U . Then, as is easily seen, A := B K and N := K • M satisfy the desiderata of (iii).
Finally, we assume (iii). Suppose K : U £ V . Let M be the interpretations of V provided by Theorem B.3, such that M : U £V and U B M implies U +A P N V B. By the Σ 1 -soundness of N , we may conclude: that U B M implies V B, and we are done. P Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13A, 3512BL Utrecht, The Netherlands E-mail address: albert.visser@phil.uu.nl
